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 1 Introduction
The advantages for innovation of a ﬁrm being large were ﬁr s t l yp o i n t e do u tb yS c h u m p e t e r
in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). He argued that there were innovation
“capability advantages” of large ﬁrm size stemming from economies of scale in research
and development (R&D) and management, greater capabilities for risk spreading, ﬁnance,
etc. In summary, large ﬁrms have a level of production, productive capacity, marketing
arrangements, and ﬁnance that enables them quickly to exploit a new technology at
relatively large scale. However, the argument that large ﬁrms can be more eﬃcient in
R&D has been countered by arguments like that the bureaucratic control structure of
large ﬁrms may partially or even fully oﬀset these latent advantages, or even by the fact
that weak competition may reduce the spur to innovation in large ﬁrms.
Despite substantial interest in the question little direct evidence on R&D and market
structure has appeared in the literature. Simultaneous inﬂuences between R&D and
concentration have been suggested and tested (see for example Connolly and Hirschey
(1984) or Nelson and Winter (1982)). However, the literature on innovation and market
structure has never reached a deﬁnitive conclusion on the relationship between ﬁrm size
and investment in R&D activities. Neither empirical observations nor theoretical models
come to any clear conclusions on this subject.
In this paper, I address the important question of the relationship between innovation1
a n dm a r k e ts t r u c t u r ea n dh o wi n i t i a lp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sa ﬀect the incentives to innovate.
On the one hand, it is also a common feature in the real world that ﬁrms diﬀer, and
this asymmetry might refer to size, cost structure or R&D commitment. Although in the
context of R&D competition, it is important to understand how the outcome is inﬂuenced
by the presence of asymmetries amongst ﬁrms, most of the literature on non-tournament
models of innovation focuses on symmetric or identical ﬁrms. (see for example Spence
(1984) or D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)). In our model, asymmetry is presented
by allowing ﬁrms to diﬀer in their initial production costs.
1Innovations that reduce the cost of production of an existing good are called process innovations,
while those that create new goods are called product innovations. We will focus on process innovations.
1On the other hand, while there are some theoretical models that have tried to capture
the advantages of ﬁrms large size in R&D in a duopoly (see for example Rosen (1991),
Barros and Nilssen (1999), Poyago-Theotoky (1996) or Xiangkang and Zuscovitch (1998)),
to the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to extend the model to the more
general case of the oligopoly of n ﬁrms2.
Therefore, the aim of the paper is the following: in an asymmetric model of n ﬁrms
performing cost-reducing R&D activities, we analyze the incentives of the ﬁrms to innovate
depending on their initial degree of eﬃciency. We also check how the implementation of
R&D activities aﬀects market concentration. R&D is assumed to be undertaken before
the output is produced, with ﬁrms anticipating the eﬀect of the R&D on the resolution
of their market shares. I obtain that eﬃcient ﬁrms spend more in R&D than ineﬃcient
ﬁrms, which means that larger ﬁrms, in terms of market share, invest more than smaller
ﬁrms. Furthermore, they over-invest in R&D in order to increase their market share. This
leads market concentration to increase conﬁrming the Schumpeterian positive relationship
between innovation and concentration.
As it was stressed, the strategic game played by ﬁrms leads to overuse R&D in absence
of government policy. As national governments in a number of countries subsidize R&D
of ﬁrms, in our model, industrial policy is also discussed3.T w o d i ﬀerent measures are
analyzed: production and R&D taxes (or subsidies). The motivation for the government
policy in the paper is to tax R&D eﬀorts to curtail the strategic incentives of ﬁrms to
over-invest in R&D to achieve a higher market share. The Optimal Industrial Policy
also prescribes a production subsidy to compensate possible output decreases due to the
R&D tax. What is obtained is that the Optimal Industrial Policy decreases market
concentration, as it is corrective to the increase in the initial production cost gap among
ﬁrms provoked by the implementation of R&D activities.
I also introduce a ﬁrm-speciﬁc industrial policy, which is diﬀerent R&D taxes among
ﬁrms. The intuition behind it is that the support of R&D activities may be, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
or even project-speciﬁc. We obtain that ﬁrms are also generally taxed to reduce their in-
2Belleﬂame (2001) is an exception. However, his model diﬀers from mine at least in two aspects. First,
in his work ﬁrms are ex − ante identical and second, ﬁrms can also perform R&D to diﬀerentiate the
product.
3It has also been discussed in a few papers of international R&D competition, see for example Spencer
and Brander (1983) or Miyagiwa and Ohno (1997).
2vestment in R&D. However, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy prescribes that more quantity-eﬃcient
ﬁrms should be taxed at a lower rate, basically due to the fact that in the welfare maxi-
mization, the speciﬁc tax is used to divert production to the more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Thus, by
its nature, this ﬁrm-speciﬁc industrial policy causes an increase in market concentration.
In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we analyze the relationship between
innovation and concentration. In section 4 the optimal industrial policy is characterized.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
32 The Model
We consider a market whose demand is given by a linear inverse demand function,
P = a − Q (1)
Where P is the price and Q is total quantity supplied in the market. There are n
ﬁrms competing in quantities and selling a homogeneous good4,w i t hQ =
Pn
i=1 qi.T h e
unit production cost depends on the R&D activity performed by the ﬁrm in such a way
that the R&D outcome reduces the constant marginal cost of producing the ﬁnal good.
In particular, the unit production cost of ﬁrm i is given by:
di = ci − xi (2)
Where ci <ais the initial level of unit production cost of ﬁrm i,a n dxi is the level of
ﬁrm i R&D investment, where i =1 ,...,n. That is, as indicated by the subscripts, we do
not restrict ﬁrms to be equal.
The R&D costs are given by γx2
i with γ>0. We assume γ to be equal across ﬁrms.
This is done for convenience as my interest lies in how asymmetries in costs functions,
and therefore in ﬁrms’ size in terms of market share, aﬀect industrial policy and market
structure. Therefore, ﬁrm i proﬁt function is:
Πi(qi,d i)=( P − di)qi − γ(ci − di)
2 (3)
We assume in our model that R&D is strategic and it involves a two-step game. The
corresponding nonstrategic model would be one in which R&D would be used only to
minimize costs, and the equilibrium would be the standard cost-minimization Cournot
equilibrium that would naturally arise if R&D and output were simultaneously deter-
mined.
4The assumption of a homogeneous good leads naturally to Cournot competition. Under Bertrand
competition, no asymmetry can survive with a homogeneous good.
4In our model, ﬁrms simultaneously choose R&D levels, these R&D levels are made
known to each other, and then output levels are also simultaneously determined. In the
ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms choose R&D levels, and in the second stage, output levels. I look for the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this two stage game.
The quantities produced by each ﬁrm as a function of the vector d =( d1,...,dn),t o t a l
output and price respectively in the second-stage equilibrium are:
qi(d)=
a − (n +1 ) di +
Pn
i=1 di
n +1
i =1 ,...,n; (4)
n X
i=1
qi ≡ Q =
na −
Pn
i=1 di
n +1
(5)
P =
a +
Pn
i=1 di
n +1
(6)
Then, from (4) and (6) respectively we obtain the eﬀect of changes in marginal costs
in the standard linear Cournot setting, that is:
∂qi
∂di
= −
n
n +1
∂P
∂di
=
1
n +1
∂(
qi
Q)
∂di
< 0 (7)
To obtain the equilibrium in the ﬁr s ts t a g ew em a k eu s eo fat e c h n i q u ed e v e l o p e di n
Saracho (2002) to deal with asymmetric situations. Although, in fact, ﬁrms choose the
level of R&D (xi), for computational reasons it will be more convenient to think that
they choose the level of its marginal cost in the production stage (di). (2) relates directly
both variables. We assume also γ ≥ 1 , and therefore the convexity property required
with respect to xi to ensure that second-order condition of ﬁrm i0s maximization problem
is satisﬁed. Firm i looks its ﬁnal unit cost of production (di) that maximizes its proﬁts.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂Πi(qi,d i)
∂di
=( P − di)
∂qi
∂di
+(
∂P
∂di
− 1)qi +2 γ(ci − di)=0 i =1 ,...,n (8)
5We introduce (4), (5), (6) and (7) in (8) and simplifying we obtain that the ﬁrst order
condition for ﬁrm i becomes:
∂Πi(qi,d i)
∂di
= −2na − 2n
n X
i=1
di +( 2 n(n +1 )− 2γ(n +1 )
2)di +2 γ(n +1 )
2ci =0 (9)
We proceed now adding all n ﬁrst order conditions, leading us to the following expres-
sion:
−2n
2a − 2n
2
n X
i=1
di +( 2 n(n +1 )− 2γ(n +1 )
2)
n X
i=1
di +2 γ(n +1 )
2
n X
i=1
ci =0 (10)
Then,
n X
i=1
di =
−n2a + γ(n +1 ) 2 Pn
i=1 ci
γ(n +1 ) 2 − n
(11)
Thus, deﬁning c =
Pn
i=1 ci ,i fw er e p l a c e(11) in (9) we obtain di.
di =
an2 − (a + c + ci)γn(1 + n)+ciγ2(1 + n)2
(γ +( −1+γ)n)(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
(12)
Using (11) and (12) in (4) we can obtain the level of production5. Taking into account
that xi = ci − di ,f r o m(12) we also obtain the optimal level of R&D for ﬁrm i6.T h e y
are respectively:
5It is implicitly assumed that ﬁrms are not too asymmetric in terms of their initial costs in such
a way that in equilibrium we have qi > 0 ∀i =1 ,...,n. This is implied by the following condition :
ci <
γ
Pn
j6=i cj(1 + n)+a(γ +( −1+γ)n))
n(−1+γ(1 + n))
∀i =1 ,...,n
Observe that this implies that in equilibrium all ﬁrms obtain positive proﬁts and perform a positive
amount of R&D. Furthermore, it also implies that in equilibrium xi ≤ ci.
6High levels of R&D characterize this equilibrium for the output levels chosen. That is, the strategic
behavior may induce ﬁrms to use more R&D than required to minimize the cost of the output produced
(see Brander and Spencer (1983)).
6qi =
γ(1 + n)(cγ(1 + n)+a(γ +( −1+γ)n) − ci(−n + γ(1 + n)2))
(γ +( −1+γ)n)(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
i =1 ,...,n, (13)
xi =
n(nci − γ((1 + n)2ci − c)+a(γ +( −1+γ)n))
(γ +( −1+γ)n)(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
i =1 ,...,n, (14)
Whereas total output produced by ﬁrms in equilibrium is7:
Q =
(1 + n)(γ(an − c))
−n + γ(1 + n)2 .( 1 5 )
3 The R&D Competition and market concentration
From the previous equations we obtain that since R&D reduces constant marginal cost
of producing, an equal R&D outcome is proportionally more eﬀective for a low-cost ﬁrm,
as the cost reduction is applied to a greater amount of production. This leads us to the
following result:
Proposition 1 The eﬀects on outputs and R&D investments of changes in parameters
are:
∂xi
∂γ
< 0;
∂xi
∂ci
< 0;
∂qi
∂γ
< 0; i =1 ,...,n (16)
Thus, the initial cost gap among ﬁrms is broadened by the performance of R&D
activities. This shows that ex-ante asymmetries in production costs result in a higher
incentive to invest in R&D by a lower cost ﬁrm, and also shows that R&D activities leads
to an increase in production costs asymmetries. That means that low cost ﬁrms increase
7Observe that Q>0 is always satisﬁed as ci <a=⇒ c<a n .
7their lead over high-cost ﬁrms. R&D activities can then be viewed as an instrument to
leverage market power. This result has been already obtained for the duopoly case (see for
example Barros and Nilssen (1999), Poyago-Theotoky (1996) or Rosen (1991)), however
we have extended it for the n ﬁrms case.
On the one hand, we see that if R&D becomes more expensive (γ increases), the direct
eﬀect is that ﬁrms invest less, in such a way that when γ goes to inﬁnite, ﬁrms do not
invest at all (xi =0 ) , and the model becomes the standard Nash-Cournot model without
R&D. At the same time, as introduced by Proposition 1, and in line with its intuition, the
level of R&D performed by a ﬁrm depends negatively on its initial per unit production
cost (ci).
On the other hand, there is an indirect eﬀect, when R&D becomes more expensive
ﬁrms reduce their production given that they do less R&D and therefore they are less
eﬃcient.
As I mentioned, an important issue would be to consider the eﬀect of R&D invest-
ment on market performance. Together with ﬁrm size, the relationship between market
structure and innovative behavior is of major concern for economists and policy makers.
The interest derives from the Schumpeterian hypothesis that “large ﬁrms are more than
proportionately more innovative than small ﬁrms” (see Kamien and Schwartz, (1991)).
Schumpeter suggests a positive relationship between market concentration and innovative
activity. The possibility available to the innovator to exert market power provides him
with the incentives to undertake the required investment. However, the theoretical models
that have been developed in order to analyze the diﬀerent aspects of the relationship do
not provide us with clear conclusions. In this sense, several arguments are exposed; On
the one hand, a more concentrated market would allow ﬁrms to better capture consumer
value than a less concentrated market providing incentives for early adoption (Saloner and
Shepard, (1995)). On the other hand, the counterargument seems to centre on the fact
that this higher concentration would however, undermine the pressures to adopt exerted
by the existence of higher levels of competition. A key issue in the analysis of market
structure is endogeneity: market structure may impact on R&D decisions, but R&D de-
cisions will also inﬂuence subsequent market structure. In this sense, we will try to shed
some light from a somewhat diﬀerent perspective: in a scenario where asymmetric ﬁrms
spend on R&D activities, to which structure does the market evolve?
8In the United States, The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses the Hirschman-
Herﬁndahl Index:
HHI =
n X
i=1
(
ﬁrm sales
total sales
∗ 100)
2
as an indicator of whether or not an industry is subject to monopoly power. An HHI
under 1000 is considered as an indicator of healthy competition. An HHI increase of 100
or more is likely to trigger an investigation, and a HHI above 1800 could be considered as
evidence of a monopoly. We analyze the eﬀe c to ft h eR & Dc o s to nt h eH e r ﬁndahl Index
(HI):
HI =
n X
i=1
(
ﬁrm sales
total sales
)
2
It is just in a diﬀerent scale of that the HHI, then: HHI =1 0 .000∗HI. In our model of
heterogeneous costs, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 The HI is decreasing in γ.
W h a tP r o p o s i t i o n2t e l l su si st h a ta sR & Db e c o m e sm o r ee x p e n s i v e ,t h em a r k e t
becomes less concentrated. The intuition comes basically from the following:
∂xi
∂γ∂ci
=
n2(1 + n)(2n + γ(1 + n)2(−2+γ(1 + n))
(γ +( −1+γ)n)2(n − γ(1 + n)2)2 > 0.
As we know from Remark 1, as γ increases ﬁrms spend less in R&D. However, from
t h el a s td e r i v a t i v ew ek n o wt h a tt h er a t ea tw h i c hﬁrms decrease their R&D depends
positively on their initial unit production cost (ci). Therefore, as γ increases, the more
ineﬃcient is the ﬁrm, the smaller is its R&D reduction. We have then, that ineﬃcient
ﬁrms get their market share increased through a smaller R&D cut. In Proposition 2, we
ﬁnd a positive relationship between innovative and concentrated markets which is clearly
Schumpeterian8.
8“Creative ﬁrms prosper and in contrast, ﬁrms that do not innovate, or that innovate in ways con-
sumers do not value, are destroyed by their more creative competitors” (Schumpeter (1942)). He calls
this process of economic selection, the culling on non-innovative ﬁrms, creative destruction.
9Remark 1 The HI is higher when ﬁrms can perform cost reducing R&D activities.
On balance, our model predicts that increased cost of R&D (γ), controlling for other
factors, has a negative eﬀect on market concentration consistent with the Schumpeterian
hypothesis that less concentrated-less innovative and concentrated-innovative markets
schemes can be observed.
We have seen which is the eﬀe c to nm a r k e tc o n c e n t r a t i o no ft h es t r a t e g i cR & D .I n
the following section we will see which is the optimal government intervention and its
consequences on ﬁrms behavior and on market structure.
4 The Optimal Industrial Policy
Market failures can provide a rationale for government intervention to either support
or curtail incentives to perform private R&D. It is frequently found in the literature9
that ﬁrms may use excessive strategic R&D to restrict competition. In this case, the
level of R&D performed is higher than the one that would minimize production costs
if R&D and output were simultaneously determined. What we are interested to see in
this subsection is what does this behavior call for regarding the industrial policy. In our
model of domestic ﬁrms without international competition, the strategic motive of the
government for intervention to diminish the rivalry of foreign ﬁr m si se x c l u d e d 10.T o
that extent, two diﬀerent policies are considered. Basically we want to check wether the
industrial policy should either subsidize or tax R&D activities and production. Therefore,
we introduce a tax (or subsidy) on R&D by itself and a tax (or subsidy) on production11.
T h ei n t r o d u c t i o no ft h e s ep o l i c i e sa ﬀect both the levels of R&D committed by ﬁrms
and the resolution of the output game given R&D levels. We allow for a tax on each ﬁrm
per unit of its R&D investment. Denote this tax rate by σ. We also allow for a production
9See for example Brander and Spencer (1983) and Spencer and Brander (1983).
10See for example Spencer and Brander (1983) or Barros and Nilssen (1999).
11An Issue not raised here which would have a bearing on the question of a tax vs. a subsidy on R&D
is uncertainty. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) concluded that optimal R&D policy would require a precise
assessment of the role that uncertainty plays in the R&D process. Moreover, R&D subsidy can play a
positive strategic role.
10tax on each ﬁrm of α per unit of output produced. Thus, we are now interested in the
following three-stage game: in stage 1 the government decides on the optimal vector
(σ,α) of taxes, that is the simultaneous introduction of R&D and output taxes. In stage
2 ﬁrms decide their level of R&D activities, thus determining their production costs for
the subsequent output decision. Finally in stage 3 ﬁrms decide their output levels.
Now ﬁrm i has a proﬁtf u n c t i o ng i v e nb y :
Πi(qi,x i,σ,α)=( P − α)qi − (ci − xi)qi − γx
2
i − σxi (17)
We seek the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. The government maxi-
mizes social welfare, taking into account consumers’ surplus, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and revenues
from the taxes. Thus, the government maximizes12:
W = Σ
n
i=1(Πi(qi,x i,σ,α)+σxi + αqi)+
1
2
Q
2 (18)
Thus, now the equilibrium quantity produced by ﬁrm i that is the solution to the
third-stage problem, and the level of R&D implemented by each ﬁrm that is the solution
to the second-stage problem, both depend on the magnitude of the taxes (σ,α) chosen.
Thus, we proceed like in the previous section and we obtain that maximizing ﬁrms proﬁts
(17) with respect to di and adding all ﬁrst order conditions again, the equivalent for (11)
is now:
n X
i=1
di =
2γc(1 + n)2 + n(1 + n)2σ − 2n2(a − α)
2γ(n +1 ) 2 − 2n
(19)
So it is straightforward to obtain the R&D and output levels in equilibrium that
depend on the vector of taxes (σ,α).
At the same time, substituting in (18) the values for qi and xi obtained and maximizing
with respect to σ and α, we get the explicit forms for the optimal R&D and output taxes
that would be implemented by the government. This leads us to the following result13:
12The absence of a distortionary cost of public funds is assumed.
13See the Appendix for the Second Order Conditions.
11Proposition 3 The optimal industrial policy calls for a production subsidy (α<0) and
for a tax on the level of R&D performed by ﬁrms (σ>0). The equilibrium tax and the
equilibrium subsidy are respectively:
σ
∗ =
2γ(1 + n)(−1+3 n)(an − c)
n(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
(20)
α
∗ =
2(c − an)(n +3 ( n2 + γ(1 + n)2))
n(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
(21)
We can observe that the policy prescribes taxing the level of R&D performed by the
ﬁrms to curtail the strategic incentive to over-invest, while at the same time prescribes an
output subsidy to stimulate production. Then, the eﬀect (see Barros and Nilssen (1999))
of the proﬁt-shifting motive that calls for a R&D subsidy in quantity competition is oﬀset
b yt h ef a c tt h a tﬁrms spend too much in R&D. Thus, the tax corrects the incentives
to do R&D beyond what cost minimization prescribes, meanwhile the output subsidy
encourages ﬁrms’ production.
Some comparative statics’ about (20) and (21) can be obtained to clarify:
Remark 2
∂σ∗
∂γ
< 0;
∂α∗
∂γ
> 0
The ﬁrst derivative tells us that when the cost of R&D increases, as the level imple-
mented by ﬁrms is reduced (see Proposition 1), the optimal policy calls for a lower tax
on the R&D activities. At the same time the second derivative, following the intuition
described above, claims that when the cost of R&D increases, the optimal output subsidy
is reduced. The reason is that the need to stimulate production to oﬀset the eﬀect of the
R&D tax on ﬁrms’ production is lower when the tax is lower because the cost of R&D
increases.
Once the optimal industrial policy has been characterized, we are now ready to see the
eﬀect of both policy tools on market concentration. The consequences of the introduction
12of both policy instruments on ﬁrms’ production and on ﬁrms’ level of R&D clarify mat-
ters. Deﬁning qi(σ∗,α ∗) and xi(σ∗,α ∗) like the quantity produced and the level of R&D
implemented by each ﬁrm under the optimal industrial policy characterized by (20) and
(21)14.U s i n g qi and xi from (13) and (14), and comparing, we obtain that:
qi(σ∗,α ∗) − qi =
γ(1 + n)(an − c)(1 + 3n2 +6 γ(1 + n)2)
(n(−n + γ(1 + n)2)(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
xi(σ∗,α ∗) − xi =
(c − an)(−2n2(1 + 3n)+γ(1 + n)2(−1+n(−4+3 n)))
(n(−n + γ(1 + n)2)(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
,
thus, (as γ ≥ 1 and c<a n ):
qi <q i(σ
∗,α
∗) ∀i ∈ 1,...,n (22)
xi >x i(σ
∗,α
∗) ∀i ∈ 1,...,n
That is, the simultaneous output subsidy and R&D tax expand ﬁrms’ production.
However it is important to remark that this is achieved reducing the level of R&D per-
formed by ﬁrms in equilibrium. Therefore, the eﬀect of strategic R&D to lower own
marginal cost to get a higher market share is reduced by the tax but at the same time the
potential reduction in output is compensated by the subsidy. The linearity of the model
allows us to present an interesting lemma that introduces which is the eﬀect of (20) and
(21) on the market structure.
Lemma 4 The following holds:
qi(σ
∗,α
∗) − qj(σ
∗,α
∗)=qi − qj ∀i,j ∈ 1,...,n
This means that variations on ﬁrms’ production due to the introduction of the optimal
industrial policy formed by (σ,α) do not depend on the initial production cost of the ﬁrm.
This leads us directly to the following result:
14See the Appendix for a proof that the equilibrium with the Optimal Industrial Policy is also interior.
13Proposition 5 The introduction of the optimal industrial policy characterized by (20)
and (21) reduces the HI.
The market becomes less concentrated. Basically we have that with a subsidy on
p r o d u c t i o na n dw i t hat a xo nt h eR & D ,t h ee ﬀect described in Proposition 2 of eﬃcient
ﬁrms achieving a higher market share via an over-investment in strategic R&D vanishes.
This proposition implies that one of the consequences of the strategic R&D performed by
ﬁrms in an asymmetric market, that the industrial policy wants to mitigate, is the raise
in market concentration.
A related question would be the relationship between both policy tools. In this sense,
the following result shows how the prescribed production subsidy is inﬂuenced by the need
to tax the over-investment in R&D. We get the following:
Lemma 6 The optimal production subsidy that would be prescribed in absence of a R&D
tax is smaller than (21).
The intuition of the last result is clear. The presence of a R&D tax calls for a higher
output subsidy given that the tax reduces the level of the R&D performed by ﬁrms, and
also has the eﬀect of cutting ﬁrms production.
Another interesting issue would be then to analyze which is solely the eﬀect of the tax
on R&D on the HI. In this sense, an interesting comparison would be to see Proposition
3 and 5 when there are no production subsidies. Assume α =0 .I ti se a s yt os e et h a t
now we have that the optimal tax on the level of R&D is:
σ
0
=
2(an − c)(−2n2 + γ(1 + n)2(3n − 2))
n(1 + n)2(−2 − 5n +6 γ(1 + n)2)
(23)
We obtain again that σ
0 > 0 15. The absence of production subsidies does not change
the policy prescription of taxing ﬁrms to reduce ﬁrms’ incentives to over-invest in strategic
15As in Barros and Nilssen (1999) we ﬁnd that when production subsidies are not implemented, the
optimal industrial policy calls for a tax on the R&D. Their tax however, is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc industrial policy
in an open economy with foreign competition.
14R&D. However, the homogeneity of the tax lead us to the following result, which is the
equivalent to Proposition 6:
Proposition 7 The introduction of the optimal industrial policy characterized by (23)
increases the HI.
From the last Proposition we see that with the introduction of an industrial policy
where production is not subsidized, the market becomes more concentrated. Although the
R&D tax reduces the level of R&D implemented by the ﬁrm, eﬃcient ﬁrms achieve a higher
market share because under this tax structure ﬁrms are equally penalized independently
of their initial production costs. Therefore, with the introduction of (23), ﬁrms become
more quantity asymmetric. This Proposition implies that it is precisely the introduction
of the production subsidy (α) what reduces the concentration of the market.
4.1 A Firm-speciﬁc industrial policy
Our concern in this subsection is about one important aspect of R&D subsidies or taxes
that distinguishes these policy instruments from other trade-policy instruments. While
the former instruments tend to be industry-speciﬁc, the support (or taxation) of R&D
activities can also be, by its nature, ﬁrm speciﬁc and even project speciﬁc.
Barros and Nilssen (1999) do comparative statics about the nature of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
industrial policy. Their model however, basically diﬀers from ours as they do not specify
a particular form for R&D costs and therefore they can not explicitly solve the model.
Furthermore they do not consider consumers’ surplus in national welfare.
However, when R&D activities are either taxed or subsidized diﬀerently among ﬁrms,
the question that naturally arises is which ﬁrm should receive such support or be taxed.
In our asymmetric model we face this question, asking whether ﬁrms should get their
R&D output taxed or not and which ﬁrms should pay the lowest tax or get the highest
subsidy.
To that extent we consider the introduction of a ﬁrm speciﬁcR & Dt a x( o rs u b s i d y )
that we call σi. The timing of the game is the same three-stage situation described in the
last subsection. Therefore the proﬁts that ﬁrm i w o u l do b t a i na r e :
15Πi(qi,x i,σ i)=q
2
i − γx
2
i − σixi (24)
Output produced by ﬁrm i that depend on σi and total output produced by ﬁrms are
easily obtained. We proceed again like in the previous subsection looking for the new
production cost (di) that maximizes ﬁrms proﬁts16. They are the solution to the second
stage problem:
qi =
(1+n)(2cγ2(1+n)+2aγ(γ+(−1+γ)n)−(−n+γ(1+n)2)(2ciγ+σi)+γ(1+n)Σn
i=1σi))
2(γ+(−1+γ)n)(−n+γ(1+n)2) (25)
Q =
(1 + n)(−2cγ +2 anγ − Σn
i=1σi)
2(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
(26)
A tt h es a m et i m ew ek n o wt h a te a c hﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the
level of its R&D investment is:
∂Πi(qi,x i,σi)
∂xi
=2 qi
∂qi
∂xi
− 2γxi − σi =0 (27)
Whereas the government maximizes social welfare that is:
W = Σ
n
i=1(Πi(qi,x i,σi)) +
1
2
Q
2 + σixi (28)
To have governments’ preferred outcome, we proceed like in Barros and Nilssen (1999).
To obtain the equilibrium, we proceed to the ﬁrst stage, the government chooses an R&D
tax for each ﬁrm. The tax is obtained in the following way. It is assumed that the
government is able to choose R&D activities for each ﬁrm, xi, directly. Therefore, the
optimal government choices solve the following condition:
∂W
∂xi
=2 [ Σ
n
j=1qj
∂qj
∂xi
] − 2γxi + Σ
n
j=1qjΣ
n
j=1
∂Σn
j=1qi
∂xi
=0 (29)
16In this subsection it is assumed that the government is only interested in the social optimality of
R&D. Therefore, only a ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy regarding the investments in innovation is considered.
16Therefore, the optimal ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy should make (29) and (27) hold. Since in
our model
∂qi
∂xi
= n
n+1 and
∂qi
∂xj
= − 1
n+1,w eh a v et h a t :
σi =
Q − 2qi
n +1
(30)
Where qi and Q are “post-tax” quantities, respectively (25) and (26). Barros and
Nilssen (1999) without considering consumers surplus in the social welfare obtain σi =
2(Q−qi)
n+1 . That is, they obtain that the industrial ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy prescribes always a
tax for each ﬁrm. However, we obtain the speciﬁc form for the optimal industrial ﬁrm-
speciﬁc tax (or subsidy). To that extent, we replace (25) and (26) in (30) and adding up
to n. We obtain:
Σ
n
i=1σi =
2(a − c)γ(−2+n)n
−2 − n +2 γ(1 + n)2 (31)
Replacing (31) in (25) and (26), we are ready to obtain the explicit form for the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy described in (30). It leads us to the following result:
Proposition 8 The optimal industrial ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy prescribes a tax on the R&D
when the ﬁrm does not have a market share larger than 1
2. Otherwise, the policy prescribes
a subsidy. The equilibrium tax (or subsidy) is:
σi =
γ(a(−2+n)(γ+(−1+γ)n)+c(n−3γ(1+n))+2ci(−n+γ(1+n)2)+
(a−c)(−2+n)n(n−3γ(1+n))
−2−n+2γ(1+n)2 )
(−1+γ)(1+n)(−n+γ(1+n)2) (32)
Last proposition speciﬁes that a ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy also prescribes taxing ﬁrms to
curtail the strategic incentive to over-invest in R&D unless the ﬁrm is so eﬃc i e n tt h a tt h e
market is almost monopolized. In this case, the optimal policy calls for a subsidy to the
R&D of this ﬁrm.
A related question is how ﬁrms are penalized by the tax because they are better
positioned or not from the start. Looking at (32) , we see that:
17Remark 3 Those ﬁrms that are more eﬃcient are taxed less.
This remark implies that more eﬃcient ﬁrms are penalized less than ineﬃcient ﬁrms
by the government because they are somehow more cost-eﬀective in conducting R&D
activities. More quantity-eﬃcient ﬁrms should be taxed at a lower rate. This means that
the tax is used to divert production to the more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
A central question is, of course, how this ﬁrm speciﬁc policy aﬀects market structure.
As we can deduce from the last proposition, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 9 The introduction of the optimal ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy increases the HI.
We can see from the last proposition that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc policy described in Propo-
sition 8 increases market concentration. It is clear form Remark 4 that through the policy
described by the vector (32) ex-ante asymmetries in production costs are increased and
then the structure of the market becomes more concentrated.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have presented a simple model of R&D competition of n ﬁrms placed
asymmetrically at the start of the game. Firms compete to get a cost reduction. What
it is obtained, in accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses, is that if we consider large
ﬁrms as those who have a larger initial market share, they spend more in R&D than small
ﬁrms. Basically, this is true due to the fact that large ﬁrms use R&D activities to reduce
competition achieving a higher market share. The more eﬃcient is the ﬁrm from the start,
as an equal R&D cost-reducing outcome is applied to a greater amount of production,
the larger are the incentives to innovate. The conclusions are that the overinvestment
in R&D beyond what cost minimization would prescribe leads to an increase in market
concentration.
The main point is therefore, that the relationship between market concentration and
innovation is positive and should be corrected by an optimal industrial policy. Within the
limited context of the model presented in this paper, some implications on the design of a
18policy can be drawn, and this is that when R&D activities are used to reduce competition
a corrective tax is needed. This corrective tax, together with a production subsidy reduces
market concentration.
When the policy is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, the government taxes less the more eﬃcient ﬁrms,
basically because the policy is used as an instrument to divert production to the more
eﬃcient ﬁrms.
Several issues have been left for future research. First, it could be fruitful to apply
to a more general framework, allowing ﬁrms to diﬀer in their R&D eﬃciency or to a
more general demand and cost functions. Second, as we pointed out in the introduction,
the relationship between ﬁrm size and investment in R&D activities is not clear in the
literature. The present model considers ﬁrms’ size in terms of market share, however,
other diﬀerent means to measure ﬁrms’ size can also be used, considering for example
ﬁrms with diﬀerent ﬁxed costs or facing asymmetric costs to entry the market.
196 Appendix
Footnote 13: The Second Order Conditions for the government maximizing social welfare
are hold as the Matrix:
Ã
∂2W
∂2σ
∂2W
∂σ∂α
∂2W
∂α∂σ
∂2W
∂2α
!
=
Ã
−n(1+n)2(−2−5n+6γ(1+n)2)
4(n−γ(1+n)2)2
n(n+3n2−γ(1+n)2(−1+4n))
2(n−γ(1+n)2)2
n(n+3n2−γ(1+n)2(−1+4n))
2(n−γ(1+n)2)2
−γn2(−2+γ(1+n)2)
(n−γ(1+n)2)2
!
is negative deﬁnite.
Footnote 14: The assumption taken in footnote 5 on production costs asymme-
tries is also enough to ensure that all ﬁrms produce under the optimal industrial policy
(qi(σ∗,α ∗) > 0 ∀i ) and we are in an interior equilibrium. The condition required for
qi(σ∗,α ∗) > 0 ∀i is ci ≤ c∗
i =
6an(1+n)(−1+γ)n+
Pn
j6=i cj(−1−3n2+6γ(−1+n)(1+n)2)
1−n−3n2(1+3n)+6γ(1+n+n3+n4) . We assumed
that ci <c 1
i =
γ
Pn
j6=i cj(1+n)+a(γ+(−1+γ)n))
n(−1+γ(1+n)) a n dw eh a v et h a tc1
i <c ∗
i if a +
Pn
j6=i cj <a n ,
w h i c hi st r u ei fci <a∀i.
Proof. Proposition 1: The level of R&D implemented by ﬁrms in equilibrium is given
by the expression:
xi(ci,γ)=
n(nci − γ((1 + n)2ci − c)+a(γ +( −1+γ)n))
(γ +( −1+γ)n)(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
So we have:
∂xi(ci,γ)
∂γ =
n(1+n)(−a(1+n)(γ+(−1+γ)n)2−c(γ2+3γ2n+(−1+3γ2)n2+γ2n3+ci(n−γ(1+n)2)2)
(γ+(−1+γ)n)2(n−γ(1+n)2)2 which is neg-
ative whenever the initial condition on ci is hold.
∂xi(ci,γ)
∂ci = − n
γ+(−1+γ)n < 0 (as γ ≥ 1)
∂qi
∂γ < 0 is implied by (2), (4) and
∂xi(ci,γ)
∂γ < 0.
Proof. Proposition 2: The HI is given by the following expression:
HI =
−2ac(γ+(−1+γ)n)2+a2n(γ+(−1+γ)n)2+d(n−γ(1+n)2)2−c2γ(1+n)(−2n+γ(1+n)(2+n))
(c−an)2(γ+(−1+γ)n)2
where d =
Pn
i=1 c2
i.T h u s ,∂HI
∂γ =
2n(1+n)(c2−dn)(−n+γ(1+n)2)
(c−an)2(γ+(−1+γ)n)3 . The sign of this derivative
depends on (c2−dn).W eh a v et h a tt h i si sn e g a t i v ew h e n (
Pn
i=1 ci)2 <n
Pn
i=1 c2
i which is
true if 0 <n
Pn
i=1 c2
i −(n
Pn
i=1 ci
n )2 that is when 0 <n
Pn
i=1 c2
i −n2¯ c2.( W h e r e¯ c =
Pn
i=1 ci
n is
the average cost). So, 0 < n
n(n
Pn
i=1 c2
i − n2¯ c2)holds if 0 <n 2(
Pn
i=1 c2
i−n2¯ c2
n ). On the other
20hand, we can develop
Pn
i=1
(ci−¯ c)2
n which is the sample variance and therefore always
positive, that is
Pn
i=1(c2
i−2¯ cci+¯ c2)
n =
Pn
i=1 c2
i−2¯ c
Pn
i=1 ci+n¯ c2
n =
Pn
i=1 c2
i−2n¯ c2+n¯ c2
n =
Pn
i=1 c2
i−n2¯ c2
n >
0. So, the arithmetic mean of values c1,...,cn is lower than their quadratic mean. This
holds when ci ≥ 0 ∀i =1 ,...,n and ∃ i,j such that ci 6= cj.
Proof. Proposition 3: We have that the taxes in equilibrium are respectively:
σ
∗ =
2γ(1 + n)(−1+3 n)(an − c)
n(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
α
∗ =
2(c − an)(n +3 ( n2 + γ(1 + n)2))
n(−1+3 n(−2 − 3n +2 γ(1 + n)2))
The denominator of (σ∗,α ∗) is positive if γ>
(1+3n)2
6n(1+n)2, which is true as γ ≥ 1.T h e n
the sign of the taxes depends only on its numerator. We have that ci <a ,t h e r e f o r e
Pn
i=1 ci = c<a n .S o ,σ∗ > 0 and α∗ < 0.
Proof. Lemma 4: We have that qi(σ,α)=
a−α−(n+1)di(σ,α)+
Pn
i=1 di(σ,α)
n+1 where:
di(σ,α)=−
2ciγ(1 + n)2 +( 1+n)2σ +2 n(α − a) −
n(2cγ(1+n)2+n(−2an+(1+n)2t+2nα)
−n+γ(1+n)2
2(1 + n)(n − γ(1 + n))
n X
i=1
di(σ,α)=
2cγ(1 + n)2 + n(1 + n)σ − 2n2(a − α)
−2n +2 γ(1 + n)2
and
qi =
γ(1 + n)(cγ(1 + n)+a(γ +( −1+γ)n) − ci(−n + γ(1 + n)2))
(γ +( −1+γ)n)(−n + γ(1 + n)2)
it is tedious but straightforward to check that qi(σ,α) − qj(σ,α)=qi − qj holds.
Proof. Proposition 5: We have that HI ≡
Pn
i=1(
qi
Q)2. Thus, using Lemma 4 we have
that the introduction of the optimal industrial policy characterized by σ∗ and α∗ means
that the concentration index turns to HI
0 =
Pn
i=1(
qi+ 
Q+n )2 where   is the variation on ﬁrms
production due to (σ∗α∗) and it is the same across all ﬁrms. Therefore, as
Pn
i=1(
qi+ 
Q+n )2 =
Pn
i=1 q2
i +n 2+2 
Pn
i=1 qi
(Q+n )2 ,i fw ec o m p a r eb o t hi n d e x e sw eh a v e : HI − HI
0 =
Pn
i=1(
qi
Q)2 −
Pn
i=1 q2
i +n 2+2 
Pn
i=1 qi
(Q+n )2 > 0 ⇐⇒
n2 2 Pn
i=1 q2
i +2Qn 
Pn
i=1 q2
i
Q2(Q+n )2 >
n 2+2 
Pn
i=1 qi
(Q+n )2 .S o n2 2 Pn
i=1 q2
i +
2Qn 
Pn
i=1 q2
i >Q 2n 2 +2  Q2 Pn
i=1 qi ⇐⇒  (n2 
Pn
i=1 q2
i +2Qn
Pn
i=1 q2
i) >  Q 2(n +2Q)
given that  >0 (it is easy to see that qi(σ∗,α ∗) >q i) The last conditions turns to be
21n
Pn
i=1 q2
i(n  +2 Q) >Q 2(n  +2 Q).T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt on
Pn
i=1 q2
i >Q 2 and therefore,
to
Pn
i=1 qi
n <
2
qPn
i=1 q2
i
n .The latter inequality holds when qi ≥ 0, ∀i =1 ,...,n and ∃ i,j such
that qi 6= qj.
Proof. Lemma 6: The optimal production subsidy it is obtained assuming σ =0 .
Then we obtain that:
α =
(c − an)(γ + n +2 γn+( −1+γ)n2)
n2(−2+γ(1 + n)2)
< 0
then we can check that the proposition holds by simply seeing α∗ − α<0.
Proof. Proposition 7: We can see that when the industrial policy consists of assuming
α =0and introducing σ
0 > 0. We can see that the equivalent for Lemma 4 also holds:
qi(σ
0,0)−qj(σ
0,0) = qi−qj. Therefore, we can apply the rea s o n i n go ft h eP r o o fo fP r o p o -
sition 5 in the following way: now  <0,s oHI decreases whenever HI ≡
Pn
i=1(
qi
Q)2 > 1
n,
which again holds when qi ≥ 0, ∀i =1 ,...,n and ∃ i,j such that qi 6= qj.
Proof. Proposition 8: It is immediate to see that as we obtained:
σi =
Q − 2qi
n +1
so, σi > 0 whenever
qi
Q < 1
2
Proof. Proposition 9: The introduction of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc industrial policy is char-
acterized by:
σi =
γ(a(−2+n)(γ+(−1+γ)n)+c(n−3γ(1+n))+2ci(−n+γ(1+n)2)+
(a−c)(−2+n)n(n−3γ(1+n))
−2−n+2γ(1+n)2 )
(−1+γ)(1+n)(−n+γ(1+n)2)
So if we compare the HI before and after the introduction of δi we can see that they are re-
spectively HI ≡
Pn
i=1(
qi
Q)2 and HI
0 =
Pn
i=1(
qi +
Pn
i=1  i
Q +
Pn
j=1  j
)2,w h e r e i is ﬁrms production
variation due to the introduction of the tax δi . It is also easily veriﬁed that qi(σi) <q i
∀i, therefore  i < 0. Therefore, HI
0 >H Iis equivalent to Q2[2
Pn
i=1 qi i +
Pn
i=1  2
i] >
Pn
i=1  i
Pn
i=1 q2
i[2Q +
Pn
i=1  i].A s  i < 0, the latter expression holds if Q2 Pn
i=1  2
i >
(
Pn
i=1  i)2 Pn
i=1 q2
i. This is true whenever | i| <q i. Thus, the condition required ensures
that the equilibrium after the ﬁrm-speciﬁc industrial policy is also interior (qi(σi) > 0)
∀i =1 ,...,n.
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